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The early 1990’s marked the beginning of a new era for Southern Africa when a number 
of single party states began the transition to multiparty democratic systems.    Within this 
process, democratic institutions were established and then have since played varied roles in 
normalizing of democratic norms in their respective countries. The elites who make these 
institutions play a vital role in maintaining democracy within these countries. This study 
examines their perceptions and actions in order to get a better understanding of the quality of 
representation and as a result the quality of democracy. 
More specifically the study examines how possible micro and macro level factors, such 
as electoral competitiveness, role orientations and electoral systems affect the level of 
constituency service performed by legislators in five Southern African countries (South Africa, 
Mozambique, Malawi, Kenya and Zambia). The majority of data used in this study comes from 
Module 3 of the African Legislatures Project. Electoral data was also collected from national 
electoral commissions and country experts.   
The results indicate that as a whole the electoral system has an effect on the level of 
constituency service conducted by legislators. Role orientation does not appear to be a factor in 
legislator’s decision about the amount of constituency service they will perform. Electoral 
competition is a factor for number of countries in the study. However, the evidence shows that in 
some cases higher levels of electoral competitiveness actually induce legislators to perform less 
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Note on Privacy Issues 
 
 
The data used in this study was taken from Module 3 of the African Legislators Project. 
The Module consists of confidential interviews of legislators in a number of Sub-Saharan 
African countries.  In order to complete this study, additional electoral data was collected outside 
the parameters of ALP and later combined with data from the Module 3 dataset.  Through the 
merging process a number of steps were taken to ensure the privacy of participating legislators. 
At no time were either names or constituency information combined with the main ALP module 






































































Since the early 1990s, many African dictatorships and authoritarian regimes collapsed to 
make way for democratic systems. Marked by elections, many hoped that this new era would 
provide African citizens with the opportunity to finally participate in political systems that were 
open and transparent.  After these initial transitions took place, the next step in the process, 
consolidation, stalled in many states.  The institutionalization of democratic institutions has been 
a slow moving process. As a result, it has become apparent that the existence of elections alone 
does not indicate the presence of democracy. Issues such as poverty, illiteracy and militarization 
have placed pressure on already fragile governments, making the full consolidation process 
much harder to achieve.  As a result, many African democratic governments have been plagued 
with weak oppositions, high levels of corruption and weak public services.  As governments 
struggle to deal with these problems, there are indications that if left untreated, the 
institutionalization and normalization of democratic norms could be stalled, making democracy 
as a legitimate political system vulnerable to erosion.(Przeworski, Alverez and Limongi,1996; 
50) 
As just alluded to, it is argued that there are in fact two major stages to the 
democratization process. The first consists of the initial transition that is most often defined as a 
period of time that contains the initial election as well as the creation of specific institutions used 
to facilitate the transition. The second stage is much more prolonged and of greater relevance to 
this study.  It contains the further development and institutionalization of democratic institutions 
that facilitate the rooting of democratic norms and expectations within a society. (Przeworski, 
Alverez and Limongi, 1996, 47; Schedler, 1998, 91)  Thus, one needs to look at institutions such 
as legislatures and electoral systems and their relationship with the electorate to gauge the 
potential level of democratization. Furthermore, as institutions are made up of elites, the belief 
systems and expectations of those within these institutions need to be examined.  If these elites 
are not democrats, then the long-term prognosis for democracy in these countries is debatable. 
(Higley and Burton
It has been noted that democratic consolidation “...hinges on the development of two 
different relationships, 1) representation of citizens by their chosen leaders, a relationship 














among rival political groups” (Barkan, 2006, 137).  This study examines the first aspect and 
rather than focusing on the electorate to determine the quality of representation, this study 
considers the legislators and their actions and beliefs within the representation process.  
The relationship between a legislator and his or her constituents is an important aspect of 
the democratic process. As a potential facilitator of political participation, legislators play an 
important role in providing the government with its needed legitimacy.  In newly democratized 
states, these relationships are especially important, as other modes of participation are often less 
developed.  Thus if legislators choose not to interact with constituents, one could argue that a 
serious democratic deficit exists.  Yet little research has been done about the nature of 
legislators’ relationships with their constituents in sub-Saharan Africa.  As a result, despite 
interest in the democratic consolidation process, little is known about one of its most important 
aspects. In the past, research on elite behaviour has most often focused on the actions of the 
executive.  Given that legislatures are often perceived as being weak, there is scant literature on 
the one aspect of a democratic system that provides it with the most legitimacy, the constituency-
legislator relationship.  This study aims to help deal with this deficit.  Thus, this project aims to 
determine the institutional aspects of democracies in developing states that influence legislators 
to spend time interacting with their constituents.  By focusing on these aspects of the democratic 
process, we are looking at the overall quality of representation in developing democracies.  
The concept of representation directs one’s attention to the attitudes of two separate 
groups; those that are being represented and those who are chosen to represent them. The 
expectations and attitudes of those who are being represented are what give legislators the 
legitimacy to make decisions on behalf of their constituents. (Eulau et al.; 1959, 743)  In Sub-
Saharan Africa, steps are being taken to get a further understanding of how the electorate 
perceives their role within the representational process, through projects such as Afrobarometer.   
This means that we now have one side of the story. This project aims to develop an 
understanding of the other side of the story. Thus, the focus of this study will be on the attitudes 
and expectations of representatives. Based on work from the African Legislatures Project (ALP), 
this study intends to examine the reported activities and belief systems of legislators across five 
















The purpose of this study is to gain a better understanding of how legislators interact with 
their constituents.  While it is recognized that there are a number of influences that may 
encourage them to act in a certain ways, the literature suggests that certain aspects of a political 
system will have larger influences than others. In this study, two major aspects will be examined, 
the electoral system and electoral competition.  The following question is being asked; 
  
1. To what extent does an electoral system and level of electoral competition affect the 
legislator’s relationship with their constituency?   
 
The legislator’s perception of their relationship with their constituency will also be 
examined. This will be done through determining each legislator’s role orientation. Role 
orientations are groupings of legislators who perceive their role as a legislator in similar ways. 
These grouping are often based on similar perspectives as to how their relationship with the 
electorate should be approached.  The role orientation literature argues that if groupings are true 
to the political landscape of the legislature in question, than the role orientation groups can be 
used to predict behaviour. 
 As a result of scarcity of resources in the countries of this study, it was determined that 
role orientation will be to be a central aspect of the study.  It is hoped that by placing legislators 
into role orientation groups we might be able to predict future behaviour, if they were to receive 
increased resources.   
Therefore, a further research question will be; 
 
2. To what extent does a legislator’s electoral system, levels of electoral competition 
















Significance of the Study 
 
In the literature based on Africa, there has been a tendency to focus on the legislature as a 
single unit of analysis. There has been little research on the single legislator within the 
representative process.  In contrast, the relationship between legislators and their constituencies 
has been studied extensively in Western focused literature.  This interest stems back to the notion 
that legislators are in some way directly responsible to those who elect them into office. (Serra 
and Moon; 1994, 201)  The degree to which legislators are accountable to their constituents has 
also been debated quite substantially.   
How a legislator individually interacts with their constituency has consequences on the 
quality of democracy for their entire country, especially in new democratized states in Southern 
Africa. This is largely the case because other channels for the electorate to interact with 
government are often not fully developed.  In the literature, it is argued that civil societies in 
many African states are not yet strong enough to be effective supporters of the democratic 
consolidation process. Due to a lack of sophistication, civil societies have generally been unable 
to hold governments accountable. (Gyimah-Boahi, 2006)  Consequently, legislators act as 
gatekeepers to political participation within the democratic process in many African states.  If 
legislators choose not to hold a dialogue with their electorate or are unable to due to the 
resources restrictions, this can have large implications for political participation and therefore the 
quality of democracy.  
Political participation means much more then solely voting. It includes collective action 
around policy issues, contacting political representatives, and direct actions like protests and 
demonstrations. (Bratton, 1999; 552)  Without it, a democracy is unable to function.  Therefore, 
in addition to monitoring the actual time legislators engage in constituency service this study 
looks at how legislators perceive their role as enablers of political participation and thus the 
entire democratic process.  
     Legislators across the continent face a similar challenge, a lack of resources.  By 
focusing on legislators’ perceptions of their roles and beliefs about their purpose, one might be 
able to get a better idea of how legislators would spend their time if increased funding was given. 
This has important implications for the donor community.  In recent years there has been an 













set up across the continent by both multi and bilateral organizations.   As an example, the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) has increased its number of parliamentary strengthening 
programs from four in 1994 to 50 in 2005. (UNDP, 2008)  The results of a study like this one 


















































































There is not an extensive literature on African legislatures or more specifically African 
legislator behaviour.  According to Barkan, between 1995 and 2002, only 22 of the 87 articles 
in the Journal “Legislative Studies Quarterly” dealt with the legislative process outside of the 
United States.  Of the 22 articles, none dealt with Africa.  Rather, much of the literature on 
legislator behaviour both in and outside legislatures is based on the American and European 
experiences.  (Barkan, Joel D., L. Ademolekun and Y. Zhou, 2004; 212) 
Therefore when examining past literature, one is forced to turn to works focusing non-
African experiences. This being said, this study is based on the assumption that since Southern 
African state’s democratic institutions are theoretically based on those developed in Western 
Europe and the United States, many aspects of the institutions will in some way influence the 
behaviour of elite actors.  Therefore, literature based on the Western experience is important in 
trying to understand elite behaviour in new democracies. The literature focused on other parts of 
the world, such as Latin America and Asia, also use Western based research as its foundation.  
However, it often takes the stance that the subject states are exceptional.  In addition, literature 
that has focused on African legislators has tended to treat the legislature as a single unitary actor. 
Often it has failed to look at legislators as individual actors within the democratic process. 
(Barkan, 1979; 267)   
The first section of this literature review covers the concept of representation and its 
relationship between constituency work.  The literature on representation is vast and there is 
most certainly a lack of space to cover all aspects of the field.   The focus will thus be on how 
levels and types constituency work can help determine the quality of representation.  In the next 
three sections, this work will give an overview of some of the main influences of legislator 
behaviour outside the legislature. The focus will be legislator role orientations, electoral 















Constituency Work and Representation 
 
Many studies have been completed which measure the levels of constituency work 
completed by legislators and examine how these levels of constituency service relate to the 
quality of representation within a specific state.  There are a number of reasons for the interest in 
this area.  Most directly, interest stems from the conclusion that policy work performed by a 
legislator is often the one of the least important components of the electorate’s decision in re-
electing an incumbent, largely because voters lack the necessary knowledge of the legislator’s 
policy positions. (Serra and Moon, 1994; 200)  Therefore, there has been a search to find out 
what aspects of the legislator’s job help them in their re-election bid.  This has become 
increasingly important, especially within the United States where there is evidence that suggests 
that incumbents have a large advantage over their competitors. 
More generally, it is argued that legislators, along with other actors such as civil society, 
play a role in linking citizens to their government in both established and developing 
democracies.  This in turn gives the government the legitimacy to carry out its day-to-day 
activities. The legislator’s role as a linkage device is especially important in Southern Africa and 
in many other developing countries, as often actors that typically provide linkage, such as civil 




According to the role orientation approach of explaining legislator behaviour, legislator’s 
behaviour is a function of their legislative role orientation.  These role orientations establish 
themselves as a result of a number of socialization experiences. (Clarke, Price and Krause; 1975; 
522)   Legislators develop role orientations towards the many actors they deal with in their job 
including constituents, fellow legislators, bureaucracy and interest groups.  It has been argued in 
the literature that the amount of time legislators spend doing constituency work should be a 
function of their role orientation. For an extended overview of this literature please refer to 













This set of literature was initially based on the work of the Edmund Burke, who 
differentiated between “trustee” and “delegate” roles.  Burke argued that in the “trustee” role, 
legislators assume that they have sufficient autonomy to act on behalf of their constituents.  In 
effect, their propensity is to deliberate and act in favour of the greater common good and national 
interest, even if it means going against the short-term interests of their own constituencies. 
(Loewenburg and Patterson, 1979; 179)  This is in contrast to the “delegate” role, whereby 
legislators perceive themselves as mouthpieces for their own constituencies.   In effect, they 
perceive themselves has having little or no autonomy from those who elected them. (Lowenburg 
and Patterson, 1979; 179)  
Since Burke developed these conceptions, the scope of literature on role orientations has 
developed into a robust field. This topic received a surge of interest during the 1950s and 1960s. 
A number of pieces stand out as the main drivers of this surge, probably the most important work 
being, The Legislative System by Heinz Eulau, John C. Wahlke, William Bachanan and LeRoy 
Ferguson. This work was based on an exploratory study that focused on the behaviour of 474 
representatives from four American states (California, New Jersey, Ohio and Tennessee).  
Within this work further aspects of roles were distinguished.  The first was the representational 
role focus. Representational role focus is concerned with a legislator's attitudinal orientation 
towards a particular geographic entity of representation, be it the constituency, province, region, 
country as a whole, or some combination of these spatial entities. (Heinz Eulau et al; 1959, 752-
3)   The second aspect of roles discussed was the representational role style.  In other words, the 
importance a legislator places on one or more of several possible influences which might affect 
his behaviour as a representative. (Heinz Eulau et al.; 1959, 749-50) The article also points out 
that the legislator’s choice of area focus will also be influenced by the democratic political 
system.  Their separation of a legislator’s spatial focus and their role orientation style was one of 
their main contributions to the set of literature. By separating these two concepts, they allowed 
for a better understanding of elite actions, as different role styles may be used in similar spatial 
orientations.   
 To understand further a legislator’s representational role style, Eulau and his associates 
broke down where a style may be created.  They determined that roles were defined by three 
fundamental types of “norms” or aspects; consensual aspects, purposive aspects, and 













constitutions, statutes, or rules of procedure as well as other unwritten norms of the legislature. 
In other words, aspects of the institutional structure that forced legislators to act in certain ways.  
Purposive aspect dealt with how legislators perceived the function of their activities.  In other 
words, what they perceived is the ultimate purpose of their activities, such as parliamentary 
activity and constituency service. As a result, this study is using levels of electoral competition to 
determine how legislators may perceive their own electoral safety.  Based on this work, it is 
assumed that these perceptions of electoral safety will affect legislator behaviour.  Finally, they 
distinguished a Representational aspect which helped legislators determine the method or 
process used to achieve their long term goals. (Eulau et al. 1962, 11-12)  
Ultimately, these differentiations have allowed us to breakdown aspects of legislator 
orientations to give us a further understanding of not only actions within the legislature itself, but 
also their relationship with their constituencies.  These differentiations are especially important 
to the purpose of this study as they theoretically back the idea that institutional settings not only 
affect a legislator’s outlook towards their own conception of their purpose as a legislator, but 
also have a direct impact on the way they choose to interact with others actors.    
Following the surge of interest during the 1950’s and 1960’s on representational roles, 
this area of scholarship saw a decline in attention. The reason for this decline was due to a 
weariness of conceptual confusion that was normally associated with early role theory. More 
importantly though, role theory, up until this point, could not explain legislator behaviour. It was 
only in the late 1980s and early 1990s scholars returned to this topic with the aim of using it in a 
more functional way. (Saalfeld and Müller, 1997, 9) 
Donald Searing’s study on British MPs during the early 1970s, later published in his 
book Westminster’s World: Understanding Political Roles in 1994, was the keystone work for 
the revival.  Searing based his analysis on a set of surveys done on 521 backbencher MPs, which 
aimed at determining how they divided their time between activities both inside and outside the 
legislature. Searing (1994) argued that backbenchers and those holding leadership positions have 
very different types of role orientations, and therefore they should be examined at separately. 
Additionally, backbenchers are largely able to choose their role orientation, yet at the same time 
their options are moulded by certain aspects of democratic institutions. (Saalfeld and Müller, 













 In his work, Searing argues that there were in fact four separate role orientations; Policy 
Advocate, Ministerial Aspirant, Constituency Member and Parliament Man. (Searing; 1994, 252) 
As the focus of this study is the legislator’s relationship with their constituency, we will briefly 
focus on Searing’s Constituency Member categorization.  Within the Constituency Member 
categorization, Searing recognized two further sub-categorizations; welfare officers and local 
promoters.  Welfare officers are concerned with the services provided to individual constituents. 
They are often increasingly likely to spend more of their time participating in individual 
casework as well as spend more time holding “surgery”.  This is in contrast to Local Promoters, 
who see their role as to meet the collective demands of their entire constituency. (Studler and 
McAlister; 1994, 387). While these groupings may not be transferable to most other legislatures 
due to historical and present realities facing the British legislature, they provide other researchers 
with a better understanding of how the nuances of parliamentary life can drastically alter how a 
legislator may perceives their role not only within the institution they are a part of but also the 
people they are meant to represent within this institution.   
 It is these works that have really formed the basis of the literature that focuses on 
legislature role orientation today.  Two approaches have been used in this literature. The first 
creates typologies and attempts to fit legislators into these, while the other approach casts doubt 
on the utility of using the defined categorizations. (Gallagher and Holliday; 2003, 108)  While 
much of the work has focused on legislatures in the Western Europe and the United States, there 
has been a recent increase in the amount of work being done on role orientation elsewhere. The 
majority of these studies have attempted a more quantitative approach by using survey and direct 
electoral data. The bulk of literature has focused on such countries as Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand (Studler and McAllister, 1996; Clark, Price and Robert Krause, 1975; Wood and Young, 
1997).    
New work on New Zealand and other states that use a PR electoral system is of relevance 
to this study.  In the past, studies on role orientation have most often taken place in states with a 
FPTP majoritarian electoral system, leaving a vast gap in the literature on the topic. This new 
literature has begun to close the gap. It is these works that provide the basis for the 
measurements methods used to measure electoral competition in PR states for this study.    It 
should also be noted that a number studies have also taken a more qualitative approach.  In these 












them in their day-to-day work.(Massicard, 2005; Ong, 1976)  The focus of these studies are often 
how political culture affects legislator choices.  As the focus is often state level political culture, 
studies such as these have less relevance in comparison to the ones already discussed above.  
   
Electoral Competition and Legislator Behaviour 
 
 In order to explain certain levels of constituency service, a group of authors have focused 
on the electoral competition legislators face in relation to the time and resources legislators  they 
spend in their constituencies.  There is little agreement in the literature as to the strength of the 
relationship between interparty competition and levels of constituency work.  The work that has 
been completed on this topic has tended to focus on levels of the interparty competition in the 
United States in relation to resource allocation decisions made by legislators. This has been the 
case especially since in the 1970s, when the United States and many other Western nations began 
to see a marked increase in the levels of constituency work done by incumbents despite no 
evidence that voters had become more aware of their presence. (Fiorina; 1981, 544)  Evidence in 
this set of literature quite often points to the psychological reasoning, as little correlation 
between constituency work and substantial electoral gains can be found.   
In Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina’s work “The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and 
Electoral Independence”, they argue that one of the largest reasons legislators in the United 
Kingdom and the United States  participate in constituency service was to increase their 
perceived “Personal Vote”.  They found that legislators in marginal seats were much more likely 
to participate in high levels of constituency service, as it was perceived that the additional votes 
gained from this service could make a difference between a win and a loss in the next election. 
(Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina, 1987, 77-88)  Since this publication, other pieces have also had 
similar findings.(Norton and Wood, 1990)  This being said, others have argued that the 
relationship is weaker than previously assumed.(McAdams and Johannes 1998; Studler and 
McAllister, 1996;1993, Searing, 1985) McAdams and Johannes argue that legislators place too 
much emphasis on constituency work when trying to understand individual legislator electoral 
margins. Rather the actions of the opposition parties, incumbent and opposition spending, 
ideological capability and voter assessment of the incumbent head of state played the same and if 













Whether constituency service plays the most important role in electoral gains or a smaller one, its 
significance is undeniable.  More importantly, through the research we can conclude the 
legislators perceive that it can impact their electoral margins. Whether it does or not, in trying to 
understand legislator’s impetus for participating in the activity it is a factor that cannot be denied.  
Thus electoral margins play an important part in this study to allow the determination of 
perceived electoral safety.  
One of the most important pieces of literature is a work was done by Warren E. Miller 
and Donald E. Stokes. The work was based on interviews of incumbent congressmen and well as 
their non-incumbent opponents in 116 congressional districts.  In addition, interviews were done 
with constituents from the chosen districts. These interviews were conducted immediately after 
the 1958 congressional election. (Miller and Stokes; 1963, 46)  The aim of the study was to gain 
a further understanding of the policy preference congruence between representatives and 
constituents in three policy areas; the approval of government action in the welfare field, foreign 
affairs, and the civil rights movement. (Miller and Stokes; 1963, 48) In effect, the extent to 
which beliefs and issues within the district effect that actions of representatives in the capitol.  
(Miller and Stokes; 1963, 48) While the focus of this work was to determine how actions of 
constituency members effected the choices made my legislators in the capitol it came to a 
number of important conclusion about the representative-constituent relationship. They argued 
one of the ways that constituents are able to control the actions of their legislatures was through 
possible non-re-election. This in turn forced legislators to keep abreast of the general views of 
their constituents.  Therefore, interaction with constituents provided a method to increase ones 
chances of re-election. 
It is a conclusion such as this that has provided that basis for this study. The idea that 
legislators will be encouraged to participated in a relationship with their constituents to maintain 
their seat is central. To further test this theory, the study will look at how electoral margins may 
affect varying levels of constituency interaction.  By making the assumption that there is a 
connection between electoral outcome and the legislator-constituent relationship, we can test 
whether the relationship changes with different electoral outcomes. Following the testing of this 
interaction, this study will also look to electoral systems as a possible influence to the legislator-
constituent relationship. The following section is general break down of the literature on this 














Electoral Systems and Constituency Service 
 
There is a vast literature on electoral systems and how they affect the institutions and 
actors they interact with. Within it, there is a wide literature that touches upon the possible 
effects of electoral structures on levels and types of constituency work in single states.  Much of 
this literature is predicated on the idea articulated by H. Eulau and his colleagues in “The Role of 
the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke”;  that the 
system in which a representative is elected in and works within helps them determine not only 
what their representational focus is on (whether it be the local district, region or state) but also 
helps the representative determine what style they will choose to interact with the public. (Eulau 
et al. 1950; 745)  
It is often argued that FPTP majoritarian electoral systems as well multi-member systems 
such as single transferable vote (STV) provide the most incentives for legislators to participate in 
constituency service.  This is in relation to closed party list systems that provide limited 
incentives for members to engage in such constituency based activities, and limited opportunities 
for citizens to contact 'their' representatives. (Norris, 1998, 208)  However, after further 
examination of more specific literature on this topic there seems to be little agreement as to the 
extent to which electoral systems actually affect legislator’s propensity to participate in 
constituency service.  
Most of the literature focuses on the differences between FPTP majoritarian and STV in 
multi-member districts systems.  No state in this study uses the STV system, so therefore 
arguments as to why this system is best at encouraging constituency service will not be covered.  
The next section will go over some of the arguments as to why a FPTP majoritarian system leads 
to higher levels of constituency service.  Following this, the overview will then turn to a number 
of cross national studies on this topic that provide a number of important insights.   
Those who argue that FPTP majoritarian systems encourage the most legislator-
constituent interaction often base their arguments on the fact that in this system a single 
legislator is responsible for a single constituency. Therefore, if a constituent approaches the 
legislator, they are unable to “pass the buck” to any other constituency representative. (Gallagher 












have even gone as far as seeing the connection between MPs and their constituencies in 
sacrosanct terms.  The “sacred trust” and “inalienable bond” is often touched upon. (Crewe, 1985 
in Gallagher and Holiday, 2003, 108) Proponents of this system argue that without having a 
single representative from each constituency there is little incentive for legislators to deal with 
their constituents. While this argument has been made in a number of works, there is less 
evidence in cross-national data to support the fact that electoral systems alone force legislators to 
participate in specific levels of constituency service. In these studies, electoral systems are often 
used as one of the many factors that lead to specific levels of constituency service, not the sole 
predictor.  
  Party ballots, where electors place a vote for a single party on either a constituency or at 
a national level, is the ballot type in which there are the least constituency level expectations of 
legislators. Whether the party lists are open or closed, candidates have little connection to a 
specific geographic location unless the party has designated such an entity.  However, magnitude 
and size of areas may vary considerably between parties within the same country.  
Large cross national studies have had varying results, some indicating the relevance of 
electoral structures on levels of constituency service, while others have not found a relationship.  
One of these studies was done by David M. Wood and G. Young, “Comparing constituency 
activity by junior legislators in Great Britain and Ireland” (1997) that compared levels of 
constituency service between British MPs and Irish legislators.  What was discovered was that 
Irish MPs actually spend more time doing constituency service in comparison to their British 
counterparts.(Wood and Young; 1997, 226) This is especially interesting as Ireland’s electoral 
system is proportional representation and STV. Thus, due to the literature, one would expect that 
Members of Parliament from Britain to participate in higher levels of constituency service, 
however this was not the case.  They argued that political culture and constituent expectations 
had a larger effect in determining levels of constituency service. 
Another cross-national study completed by Vernon Bogdanor during the mid 1980s 
found that there was not a relationship between electoral systems and levels of constituency 
service.   Rather he found that there were large levels of variation but the main determinants of 
levels of constituency service were availability of avenues for redress for constituents, strength 













The states in this study fall into perceived extreme categories when it comes to 
constituency service. Malawi, Kenya and Zambia all have FPTP majoritarian systems where 
relative to all other systems legislators are expected to participate in the highest levels of 
constituency.  South Africa and Mozambique both use a PR system, where legislators are only 
expected to develop connections with a specific geographical area if they are assigned a 
constituency or are nominated at a regional or local level. As a result, legislators who originate 
from a PR system are expected to participate in the least amount of constituency service 
comparatively to legislators from other systems. This study will test these assumptions. 
According to Pippa Norris (2004) there are certain aspects of electoral systems that play a 
role in influencing legislator behaviour. (230) The following section is an overview of these 
aspects. The first aspect is argued to be ballot structure. Ballot structure refers to the way in 
which voters express their choices on the ballot, whether a voter selects a person or party when 
they go to the polls.  Within the literature two separate ballot structures are argued to encourage 
legislators to participate in higher levels of constituency service.   
The first, and probably the most common, are candidate based ballots, where a candidate 
would find their name on the ballot alongside their party name, depending on whether they were 
running as an independent or not. It is argued that candidates may have incentives to provide 
particularistic benefits to their constituents. 1
The second ballot type which may lead to higher levels of constituency service are 
preference ballots.
 For example legislators may be more inclined to 
participate in casework by helping individual constituents or by delivering local services to his or 
her constituency.(Gallagher and Holliday; 2003; 108)  These types of actions are aimed at 
strengthening their personal support within the local community. In this study Kenya, Malawi 
and Zambia use this type of system.    
2
                                                   
1 This style of ballot would be used in a single member district; citizens in each constituency cast a single ballot for 
an individual candidate.  The winner of the poll would can be elected into office through either a majority or a 
plurality of votes.  
  In this case citizens exercise a preference vote, otherwise known as an open 
or non blocked vote.   This strengthens the chances that particular candidates from the list will be 
elected and, therefore, changes their rank on the party list. (Norris, 2004; 231) No state in this 
study uses this style of electoral system.    
2 Most often used in open-list multimember districts electors cast a ballot for a party.  Often electors will be asked 













The second aspect of electoral systems that shape the way in which legislators perceive 
constituency service is the candidate selection process. Two aspects of party politics may help 
predict levels of constituency service by legislators, the first being the general level of 
centralization of the party and the second being if primaries take place within the party and at 
what level.  The basic reasoning behind this is that when candidates are selected at the lower 
levels of the party they then have increasing responsibility to the grassroots party support. This in 
turn encourages them to develop a personal vote within either their local constituency or an area 
demarcated by the party itself. (Norris, 2004; 232)  This rings true for both candidate based 
ballots as well as party list ballots.  
What we can conclude from this group of work is that while a number of assumptions 
about how electoral systems and level of constituency service may have been made, further 
cross-national analysis needs to be done. While certain aspects of an electoral system may 
encourage legislators to act in a certain way, their does not seem to be conclusive evidence to 































































The following chapter provides definitions of the concepts used, hypotheses associated 
with each of the concepts and methods used for measurement.  
The variables outlined include;  
1. Dependent Variable 
a. Constituency Service  
i. Number of Days Spent in the Constituency while Parliament is 
in Session 
ii. Percentage of Time Participating in Constituency Service 
2. Independent Variables 
a. Electoral Competitiveness  
i. Actual Past Competitiveness (APC) 
ii. Perceived Future Competitiveness (PFC) 
b. Electoral System 
c. Role Orientation 
3. Constants 
a. Seniority of the Legislator 
b. Legislator Age 
c. Party Membership 
d. Geographic Proximity to the Constituency 
 
In advance of more detail on these variables and the hypotheses associated with them, 
information about the source and structure of the data used to create the variables will be 
outlined.  This study utilizes data gathered by Phase III of the African Legislatures Project 
(ALP).  It takes the form of responses from interviews with a representative sample of legislators 
in a five different African countries using a structured questionnaire.  The Table 3.1 provides 
details on the countries examined in this study, as well as information relevant to the interview 
process.  
The eventual aim of the African Legislatures Project is to conduct 50 interviews from 














Table 3.1: Interview Period and Sample Size 
Country Date of Interviews Number of Legislators in Sample 
South Africa  March – June 2009 25 
Mozambique March 2008 50 
Malawi March - August 2008 49 
Zambia July 2007 45 
Kenya July 2009 – June 2009 41 
     
when this study was completed.  Therefore, a total of 210 questionnaires are examined. The 
following is a table that details information about the states that will be examined;  
 
Table 3.2: Parliamentary Information 
Country Name of the Lower House Size * Electoral System 
South Africa Parliament of South Africa 400 Proportional Representation 
Mozambique Assembly of the Republic of Mozambique 250 Proportional Representation 
Malawi National Assembly of Malawi 187 FPTP Majoritarian 
Zambia National Assembly of Zambia 150 FPTP Majoritarian 
Kenya Parliament of the Republic of Kenya 222 FPTP Majoritarian 






In the literature a number of different conceptions of constituency work are used.   
Especially in American literature, there is a tendency to use the term in a narrow context, often 
only referring to “Casework”, whereby legislators look at individual cases brought to them by 
one of their constituents who are looking for help dealing with bureaucracy or other large entities 
such as big business.  Casework can refer to individual cases or to cases that affect a larger group 
of people. (Johannes, 1983; 532) However, the common assumption about all casework is that 













Constituency work in the broader sense refers to any work undertaken by a Legislator or 
his staff outside of a parliament that directly deals with citizens. (Park, 1988; 225)  This can take 
place either in the constituency itself or at the legislator’s office in the parliamentary capitol. It 
ranges from specifically casework to working with local legislators within the constituency.  Due 
to the broadness of this definition, a wide range of actions are considered part of this activity. 
For the purpose of this study, the broadest conception of “constituency work” will be 
used.  This was done for a number of reasons. First of all, it is recognized that most legislators 
that participated in the study face limited resources.  It is also assumed that limited resources 
may reduce a legislator’s ability to travel to the constituency to participate in constituency 
service, therefore, the conception used here also includes any interaction that a legislator may 
have with a constituent in the capitol as well. This was done to ensure that despite limited 
resources, all legislators had the ability to participate in some form of constituency service.  
Based on the available data there is two ways of measuring levels of constituency service.  
For the first method, legislators are asked to indicate how much of their time typically per month 
they spent in their constituency when Parliament was in session. The second method is a measure 






For the purpose of this study, electoral competitiveness is defined as a candidate’s prospect 
of being elected to office in the next election. (Schlesinger, 1991; 102)  There are a number of 
different methods for measuring it. In this study it will be measured in two ways.   The first will 
focus on the level of competitiveness each legislator faced in the previous election, based on past 
electoral margins of victory, “Actual Past Competitiveness” (APC). The second measure of 
competitiveness is based on the perceived level of competitiveness for the upcoming election, 
“Perceived Future Competitiveness” (PFC). This measure will be based on a legislator’s response 
to the questionnaire.  There are two main reasons why these conceptualizations and measurement 
methods of electoral competitiveness are used. First, the data was available. The nature of African 













the case because data on the relevant topics may vary by country. Second, this information is 
individually relevant.  Unlike descriptions of the nature of the opposition or party voting within 
Parliament, where it is hard to determine how this general information individually affects each 
legislator, electoral information is based on individuals. Therefore, it makes it possible to gauge 
how varying levels of electoral competitiveness affects individual legislators. Furthermore, it is 
assumed that this is the most tangibly information available about levels of electoral 
competitiveness to legislators.3
It is not possible to use the same method to measure APC across all five sample states, as 
the structure of electoral systems dictate that alternative measurement methods must be used for 
each system. In the case of the FPTP majoritarian systems, levels of competitiveness will be 
determined by looking at the electoral margin of victory at the election prior to when the interview 
was administered.  In cases where a legislator had a relatively low margin of victory, they are 
considered as having faced high levels of electoral competitiveness. In cases, where the margin of 
electoral victory was higher, they will be considered to have faced lower levels of competitiveness.  
An ordinal scale of safety is created, based on the work of Heitshusen, Young and Wood (2005), 
where each legislator is placed into three distinct categories based on their margin of victory in the 




Table 3.3 : Electoral Competitiveness Categories based on a legislator’s margin of 
victory in the last election 
Percentage difference between number of 
votes received by the winner and the 
runner-up 
Measurement of Electoral 
Competitiveness  
 




                                                   
3 In other studies electoral, margin of victory is an dependent variable as it was assumed constituency work would 
lead to an increase in electoral gains.  This will not be the case for this study ,as the question on electoral margin was 
gathered in relation to the election prior to the surveys being conducted. Therefore, electoral margin cannot be 
looked at to determine the effectiveness of constituency work at increasing a personal vote.  This will only be 













 In order to include legislators from PR electoral systems an alternative measurement of 
electoral competitiveness was created. Once again an ordinal scale of safety was created, based on 
the work of Heitshusen, Young and Wood (2005).  When legislators are placed higher on the party 
list, it is assumed that they have overall higher levels of electoral safety, and therefore, face lower 
levels of electoral competitiveness. In the case of legislators who are further down the list, they are 
assumed to face higher levels of electoral competitiveness and therefore lower levels of electoral 
safety.  As a result, each legislator’s APC was based on their placement in the party list.  
 
Table 3.4 : Electoral Competitiveness Categories Based on a Legislator’s Placement on 
the Party List at the Time of the Last Election 
Placement on the Party List at the 
Time of the Last Election 
Measurement of Electoral Competitiveness 
 
Top Third Safe 
Middle Third Competitive 
Bottom Third Marginal 
 
The party lists being used to determine electoral competitiveness originate from the 
election directly proceeding the interviews.  While it is possible to obtain current party lists, as it 
has become apparent that they are updated throughout the electoral cycle.4
Heitshusen, Young and Wood (2005), base their measurement system of electoral 
competitiveness on a pure PR system, where each party only has a single national list. As South 
 In FPTP majoritarian 
systems, electoral safety is most effectively obtained by looking at election results from the 
election period prior to when the examination of electoral competitiveness is being made.  In 
order to maintain continuity in measurement through both electoral systems, only party lists from 
the time of the last election are used. In cases where a legislator was not on the party list during 
the last election, it will be assumed that if there had been additional positions on the list the 
legislator in question would have taken one of these spots. Thus for the purpose of this study 
they will be placed at the bottom of their party list. Therefore, they will always be categorized in 
marginal seats.  
                                                   
4 As the party lists were not available for Mozambique, it has not been confirmed whether this is also the case on 













Africa uses an alternative system, where parties may have two lists, national and provincial, the 
method for determining the level of competitiveness was changed slightly to accommodate this 
difference. 
The South African Parliament has 400 seats. 200 of these seats are elected through party 
lists at a national level. The second 200 seats are elected through party lists at the provincial 
level. Based on the population of each province, each province elects a proportion of the 200 
seats. As a result, at a provincial level, parties compete for seats within their province’s 
allocation. It must be assumed that this system has implications on levels of electoral 
competition. As a result, the calculations used to determine level of electoral competitiveness for 
each legislator took this system into consideration.  In cases where parties were allocated less 
than 5 seats, on either a National or Provincial list, the top competitiveness category, “Safe”, was 
removed. Therefore, legislators could only fall into one of two categories, “Competitive” or 
“Marginal”. 
 Electoral data was obtained through a number of different means. The primary approach 
was through the websites of the electoral commissions from each of the sample countries.  When 
the data is not available directly through the internet, the electoral commissions were contacted 
directly (Kenya).  In the case of Malawi, Kimberly Smiddy has kindly provided the needed 
electoral data.     
 The next method for measuring electoral competition, “FPC”, is based on responses 
given by the legislators during their interviews.   In four of the five countries the following 
question was asked; “How would you rate your own electoral prospects in the [Year] election?”5
The decision to include a measure of perceived electoral competition was made due to the 
timing of the interviews within the election cycle. An assumption is being made that previous 
electoral results will have varying levels of influence on perceptions of electoral safety 
depending on the time in the election cycle the interviews were completed. In situations where an 
election is imminent, it is being assumed that previous electoral results will play less of a role. 
This is because other variables such as internal party politics may play a larger role, especially if 
a electoral system has parties with highly competitive nomination processes. (Norris, 2004; 182)  
  
In the literature, there is evidence to suggest that the perceptions of electoral safety have an 
effect on the behaviour of legislators both inside and outside the legislature. (Clarke, 1979) 
                                                   













The next table details the timing of the interviews in relation to their respective forthcoming 
elections.  
Table 3.5: Interview Dates and the Election Cycle 
Country(1) Date of Interviews Date of the Next Election after Interviews 
South Africa  March – June 2009 22 April 2009 
Mozambique March 2008 28 Oct 2009 
Malawi March - August 2008 19 May 2009 
Kenya(1) March - August 2008 
July 2009 – June 2009 
December 2012 
Zambia July 2007 October 2011 
Source: EISA Website (www.eisa.org.za)                                                                                                              
(1) All five countries have parliamentary terms of five years                      
                                   
As you can see from the above table, the interviews were done at multiple times during 
the election cycle. This means that we can expect variables to influence legislator’s perception of 
electoral safety at varying levels across countries.   
A decision was made to use the same competitiveness categories as the previous method 
of measurement to enhance continuity.  The following table provides a breakdown of how the 
responses were categorized; 
 
  
Table 3.6: FPC Breakdown based on Original Question (Zambia, Malawi, Kenya, 
Mozambique) 
Response Competitiveness Bracket 
I am not planning to stand again Safe 
I should retain my seat by a comfortable margin Safe 
I should retain my seat by a close margin Competitive 
Things are too uncertain to tell Competitive 
I am concerned I might lose my seat by a close margin Marginal 














It should be noted that “I am not planning to stand again” is being categorized as safe. 
While this initially might sound counter intuitive, the purpose of these categorizations is to 
provide an indicator of the possible “fear” of non-re-election. Those who know already that they 
are not planning will to run again are expected to have “no fear” similarly to their counterparts 
who are in safe seats.  As a result those who indicate that they are not planning on running again 
in the next election are placed into the safe category.    
 By the time that South African legislators were interviewed for the project, a number of 
small changes were made to the instrument to enhance multi-country relevance.  The question 
relating to perceptions of electoral competitiveness was modified. As a result, the responses 
more closely relate to South Africa’s electoral system, PR. The following table is a breakdown of 
how South African results are placed into the competitiveness brackets.  
 
Table 3.7: FPC Breakdown based on Original Question (South Africa) 
Response Competitiveness Bracket 
I am not planning to stand in the next election Safe 
I was in a safe and electable position on the party list Marginal 
Things are too uncertain to tell Competitive 
I was in an unelectable position on the party list Marginal 
I was not put on the list (No legislators fell into this category) Not coded 
 
 Due to a number of circumstances, a number of the interviews were completed before the 
March 2009 elections and some were completed after.  Within the dataset there was not a 
differentiation between the two groups. The data from both groups will be treated similarly.  In 
South Africa, “I am not planning to stand in the next election” was also a response.  Legislators 
who opted for this response were placed into the safe category.  In addition, “I was no put on the 
list” was also a possible response. No legislator used this response and therefore a categorization 
is not given.  
 It is expected that the level of electoral competitiveness across both measurement 
methods and electoral systems, will affect the level of constituency service in similar ways. 














H1: A positive relationship will exist between the levels electoral competitiveness and 
the levels of constituency work reported by legislators. As electoral competition 
increases, an increase in constituency service should be registered.  
 
In the FPTP electoral system, the increased levels of competitiveness is expected to 
encourage legislators to participate in more constituency service, as they may perceive that it 
could lead to a higher “Personal Vote”.  This in turn would work towards securing their re-
election in the next election. As has already been noted, a number of studies have been done to 
determine the effectiveness of the constituency service at creating a better personal vote.  The 
results are inconclusive, however, there is evidence to suggest that in many cases the perception 
it can play an important role in a successful bid for re-election, is strong enough to lead to 
heightened levels of constituency service. (Swindle, 2002; Norton and Wood, 1997; Cain, 
Ferejohn, and Fiorina,
In the case of legislators from a PR system, it is expected that those who face higher 
levels of competitiveness and are thus lower down on the parties list will have less 
responsibilities not only in the party but also the legislature itself. Therefore, one might expect 





This section of the study is based on literature that argues a legislator’s behaviour can be 
gauged by their role orientation.  Role orientations are developed through a number of 
socialization experiences. (Clarke, Price and Krause; 1975; 522) While authors have concluded 
that orientations are able to guide behaviour, there is little consensus as to how many orientations 
there are.  This study will use three broad role orientations, nationally orientated, locally 
orientated and a middle orientation.  Due to the various political systems and historical 
backgrounds of the countries in the study, it was concluded that broader, more inclusive 
categorizations would be most appropriate for a cross-national comparison. The individual 
orientations are conceptually based on the following parameters; A nationally orientated 













constituency.  Additionally, the legislator would likely believe that the national good is of higher 
importance to the needs of the local constituency.    Locally orientated legislators, by comparison 
are expected to have slightly different expectations and beliefs. They could perceive themselves 
as the mouthpieces of their constituency.  This means that their focus would be the needs of this 
group rather than the national constituency.  While it is recognized that it is impossible for 
representatives to receive and follow direct and explicit instructions from their constituents, a 
representative might still psychologically commit to the local role. Grazia points out, that role 
orientation should be seen as psychological positioning. (Grazia, 1951; 124) Therefore, in order 
to gauge a legislator’s role orientation, the initial step should be to gauge their relationship with 
their constituents.   
In other cross-national studies, some researchers have decided to provide a “party 
orientated” category. (Heitshusen, Wood and Young, 2005) In this study, a similar orientation 
will not be examined. After initial analysis of the Malawian and Mozambican data, it has become 
clear that while there may be a definite differentiation of concepts within the literature, the line is 
much less clear among legislators. More commonly, legislators did not separate national interests 
and party interests. Therefore when asked, a number of legislators stated that party interests were 
national interest and therefore the two could not be separated.  While this in itself provides 
evidence that parties may be extremely powerful in orientating legislators, at this point in time 
further research needs to be conducted on this topic.  The structure of the questions and the scope 
of this study prevent the further deconstruction of this concept. Therefore, a party orientation will 
not be used.  
 It should also be noted that while these categorizations resemble those initially set out by 
Edmund Burke, they are in fact stray slightly from his original conceptions. Burke’s orientations, 
delegate and trustee, focus on how legislators believe their mandate should be executed. 
(Loewenburg and Patterson, 1979, 179)  This study does not aim to do this; rather, the aim is to 
gain the legislator’s spatial orientation.  Rather than focusing on the way in which legislators 
choose to make their decisions, this study aims to determine what they perceive their primary 
constituency to be.  Rather, this spatial orientation will then guide them in making their 














H2: A relationship will exist between legislator role orientation and reported time spent 
doing constituency work. Locally orientated legislators are expected to participate in more 
constituency service relative to their counterparts who are nationally orientated. 
 
It is expected that legislators who are locally orientated will spend a larger proportion of their 
time participating in constituency service. While resources restrictions are expected to reduce the 
overall amount of time legislators could possibly spend in their constituencies, it is expected that 
it will not be so restrictive that legislators would be completely prevented from participating in 
constituency service altogether.  As a broader definition of constituency service is being used, it 
is expected that legislators will likely participate in constituency service from the capitol in 
addition to the constituency itself, resulting in a broad range of options to engage in constituency 
service. A further hypothesis is as follows; 
 
H3: A relationship will exist between electoral system and legislator role orientation.  PR 
electoral systems (South Africa and Mozambique) will have a relatively higher number of 
legislators who are nationally orientated relative to the FPTP majoritarian systems 
(Zambia, Malawi and Kenya). 
 
It is expected that majority of legislators originating from states that use a FPTP 
majoritarian system will be locally orientated.  There is much evidence to suggest, that FPTP 
majoritarian systems inherently encourage legislators to participate in constituency service in 
order to increase their re-election odds in the forthcoming election. (Norris, 1997; Gallagher and 
Holiday, 2003)   Thus, legislators in FPTP majoritarian systems are inherently linked to a 
constituency not only for their election prospects but also more generally, it is expected that their 
focus will more likely be on their constituency, relative to those elected through the PR system. 
 Legislators who gain their seats through a PR system are expected to be relatively more 
nationally orientated. Despite the fact that it may be common practice for parties to assign 
constituencies once the legislator is elected to office, they are less likely to directly relate their 
previous personal electoral success on a specific region. Also, due to the nature of PR systems 
and their effect on the structure of parties, it is expected that legislators will inherently have 













is the fact that their primary objective is to be re-elected, it is expected that legislators from these 
systems may place party work as a higher priority.   
In order to create the categorizations for role orientation a scale is created based on a 
number of questions relating to how legislators interact with constituents. The following tables 
provides a breakdown of how each question’s responses are coded into their respective 
orientations;  
 
Table 3.8: In your opinion, which of each of the following jobs is the most important part of 
being an MP?(Important) 
MP Response Orientation Category 
Debating Bills and Passing Laws  National 
Making Public Policy by Writing Laws  National 
Overseeing the Executive National 
Bringing Development to your Constituency Local 
Representing Constituents Views in Parliament Local 
Assisting Constituents with their Problems Local 
Soliciting Funds for your Constituency Local 
  
This first question regards what a legislator believes is the most important aspect of their 
job. A range of possible responses are provided.  
Table 3.9: For you personally, which one do you find to be the MOST rewarding? 
(Rewarding) 
Response Orientation 
Debating bills and passing laws National 
Making public policy by writing laws National 
Overseeing the executive National 
Bringing development to your constituency Local 
Representing constituents’ views in parliament Local 
Assisting constituents with their problems Local 














The second question used to create the orientation scale is quite similar, but is focuses on 
what the legislator perceives as the most rewarding part of the job. The same possible responses 
are provided. This has meant that the same categorizations are used for both questions. 
In Zambia, question two (Rewarding) was not asked.  This has meant that role orientation 
is determined using just question one (Important).  However, for all the other countries both 
questions were used.  A reliability test was run with an Alpha score of .497.  While this score is 
not as high as one might like, it is sufficient. Other combinations of variables relating to role 
orientation were also tested, however, no combination of variables had an Alpha score this high. 
In a number of cases, legislators indicated varying orientations between the two variables 
used to create the scale.  In order to prevent the loss of a significant amount of data, a decision 




The next section will focus on the possible affect of a macro level structure on the 
behaviour of legislators, the electoral system.   Over the last two decades electoral system design 
has garnered much interest again, as newly democratized states wade through the possible 
options when opting for a system.  As political scientists have created a taxonomy of electoral 
systems relating to their effects on the political system in which they are a part, it is no secret that 
different systems will affect the structure of institutions and the behaviour of actors.    It is 
expected that certain electoral systems will have certain “psychological affects” on legislators 
and therefore effects on larger issues such as political representation and accountability. (Norris, 
2004; 230) 
Ballot structure, the centralization of the candidate selection process in parties, the size of 
multimember districts as well as legislator term limitations are the main aspects of electoral 
systems that are expected to influence legislator behaviour. (Norris, 2004; 230) This study is 
focusing on ballot structure.  The main reason for this is a lack of variance across the study 
countries for many of the other possible factors. Across all five countries legislators have 5 year 
terms. (EISA, 2009)   This means that across all five countries, changes in term length are 
nonexistent and therefore term length cannot be seen as a possible factor for variance within 













single member constituencies.   For the PR states, South Africa and Mozambique, national party 
lists are produced and legislators are elected through seats based on the proportion of votes the 
party received nationally or provincially. Constituencies are only given later to individual 
legislators; however, their electoral prospects are not directly connected to this geographic 
location.  As a result, electoral prospects are not tied to any multimember constituencies in any 




Overall, the nomination process across the sample countries is diverse even at a micro-
level, making cross-national comparison difficult.  As a result, ballot structure is main aspect of 
the electoral system that is being examined in this study.  However, before we turn to the 
statistical results, lets first look at the structure of the electoral systems in each of the sample 
countries. The following table provides some basic aspects of each of the electoral systems used. 
 
Table 3.10: Ballot Structure 




Number of Seats 
Nominated by the President 
South Africa PR N/A 400 0 
Mozambique PR N/A 250 0 
Kenya(1) FPTP Majoritarian 210 210 12 
Malawi FPTP Majoritarian 193 193 0 
Zambia FPTP Majoritarian 150 150 Up to 8 
(1) Based on 2007 




Malawi uses a FPTP majoritarian system, whereby in each race a winner is determined in 
each district by gaining the most votes relative to all other competitors.  This electoral system 
has been used in parliamentary elections in Malawi since 1966, then Nyasaland.   According to 
Reynolds and Sisk (1999), the electoral system was never fully considered, nor was the 
consequences of the choice. The electoral system choice was not dealt with during the 













the Alliance for Democracy - United Democratic Front (AFORD-UDF) opposition.  It was 
concluded during these negotiations that the choice of electoral system was not a priority issue 




As in Malawi, Zambia uses a FPTP majoritarian system. It was inherited from the 
previous regime. Initially only based on 125 districts, the house now has 150 seats. Halving 25 of 
the existing districts created these additional seats. This process created a situation whereby the 
distribution of the population between districts is quite uneven. In the most extreme case, the 
largest district has over seven times the population of the smallest. (Reynolds and Sisk, 1999; 
150)  Since its induction as the electoral system of choice, Zambia has continued to use a FPTP 
majoritarian system despite a number of calls to change to a PR system during the early 




Similarly to Zambia and Malawi, Kenya uses a FPTP majoritarian system.  Despite an 
extended period of one party rule under President Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel arap Moi between 
1969 and 1992, where elections continued to take place, the electoral system has not change 
since independence.  Throughout this period parties other than the Kenyan National African 
Union (KANU) were not permitted to take part. This meant that elections more closely 
resembled primaries seen in some multiparty systems. (Barkan, 1993; 86) Since 1992, a number 




In Mozambique unlike in the first three countries already discussed, the decision to use 
the electoral system of choice was in fact calculated.  Towards the end of a long civil conflict 
within Mozambique, it became apparent an electoral system was needed that not only protected 













ravaged by years of civil war.  In terms of encouraging further divisiveness, it was thought that 
PR could provide the best solution.  The proponents of PR argue that it is in fact the most 
appropriate system for pluralist societies, like Mozambique. They argue that there are a number 
of reasons for this, but most importantly, that it allows for the election of all political entities into 
the legislature, including political spoilers. This in the long run, enhances the likelihood that all 
groups will support the overall legitimacy of the entire system. Additionally, it is argued that a 
PR system, is most likely to encourage a power sharing or a consociational democracy. 
(Reynolds, 1999; 57)  In terms of the logistics, it was also deemed impossible to conduct a 
census and demarcate the boundaries of electoral districts prior to the election, making PR the 
only possible choice. (Barkan, Densham and Rushton, 2006; 927) 
Overall, the Mozambican legislature has 248 legislators. They are elected through 11 
districts corresponding to the 10 provinces and the city of Maputo. Expatriates in Europe and 
Africa return one member each. The number of seats allocated to each district is determined 
afresh for each election based on the proportion of voters registered in each by the national 




Much like Mozambique, South Africa faced similar structural problems that prevented 
the main actors within the transition to vie for any other system to PR.  However, the system is 
not a pure PR system. Rather it is two tier system, where 50% (200) of the seats are allocated 
through contesting parties based on their total of the national vote using the Droop quota system 
while the other 200 seats are allocated on the same basis by the 9 geographical regions. 
(Reynolds and Sisk, 1998; 63) 
Based on the literature, one should expect see varying affects of the electoral system on 
legislators’ relationships with their constituencies. As a result, this study’s hypothesis relating to 
this topic is as follows; 
 
H4: There will be a relationship between electoral system and levels of reported 













relatively higher levels of constituency service compared to countries using a PR electoral 
system.  
 
As was noted above in the literature review, there is little consensus in larger cross-
national studies as to the extent in which electoral systems can be used to determine a legislator’s 
level of constituency service. (Wood and Young, 1997; Bogdanor, 1985) However, the same 
results are not expected here.  The main reason being that these studies are often conducted over 
a number of different electoral systems, including the myriad of PR systems seen in Europe. 
While the systems may vary in structure slightly, many of the same incentive structures still 
exist. This study will be looking at the two electoral systems on drastically different incentive 
structures, FPTP majoritarian and PR.  Thus varying levels of constituency service are expected.  
Based on smaller studies, this study expects to find that legislators from FPTP 
majoritarian systems will spend more time participating in constituency service in comparison 
legislators from PR systems. This is due to the fact that legislators are more likely to perceive 
that participating in constituency service may lead possible electoral gains. (Norris, 1997) As the 
assumption is that legislator’s main purpose is to maintain their seat, it must be assumed that 





 The following section provides details on a number of factors that are believed to also 
influence legislator’s level of constituency service and role orientation.  The variables include; 
seniority of the legislator, legislator age, party membership and geographic proximity. For a 



















The literature indicates that senior members are more likely to be electorally secure and 
hence may not be as motivated to engage actively in constituency work compared to less senior 
members. (Wood and Young, 1997)   Following an initial examination of the Zambian data, 
there is evidence to suggest seniority does play an important role in affecting how legislators 
interact with their constituencies.  Rather though, it shows that senior legislators interact more 
frequently with their constituents as their seniority increases.  At this point in the study, it is 
being hypothesized that this may relate to access to resources, however this cannot be tested at 
this time.  Seniority of the legislator will be controlled for. This control variable will be 




 It has been hypothesized that younger legislators may be assigned to constituencies that 
traditionally face higher levels of electoral competitiveness, as it may be perceived that younger 
legislators have the energy needed to participate in levels of constituency service needed to win.  
Also, as Wood and Young point out, younger legislators may be more amenable to pursuing 
higher levels of constituency service for the purpose of furthering their own political career 
rather than just for the purpose of re-election. (Wood and Young, 1997; 220)  Therefore, 
legislator age could also play an important role in determining the level of constituency service.  
Therefore, for the purpose of this study, legislator age will also be held constant. In four of the 
five countries each legislator was asked their age, in Zambia however, they were placed into age 
brackets. In order to allow for analysis and continuity between the variables, the median age 
from each of the age brackets was used to indicate Zambian legislators’ ages.   
 
Party Membership 
Due to the nature of African politics and more specifically government resource 
distribution, it can be assumed that legislators from the ruling party may have access to greater 
funds.  As the pressure increases from within many African societies to redistribute funds, 
leaders often expect to have the ability to distribute through partisan means. (Sandbrook, 2001; 
68) This in turn could allow legislators from governing parties to participate in higher levels of 
constituency service relative to their counterparts in opposition parties as funds are more likely to 
                                                   













be available for activities such as this.  Therefore, a variable was created that placed legislators 
into a “governing party” or “opposition party” category.  
 
Geographic Proximity to the Constituency 
In the past it has been found that geographic proximity has a positive relationship with levels 
of constituency service. In Wood and Young’s work on British and Irish legislators it was 
concluded that legislators who are required to travel a further distance to their district are likely 
to spend more time participating in constituency service.   Wood and Young explained this 
phenomenon using a number of possible justifications. Firstly, as the total cost of traveling to 
their constituency is relatively higher than other areas, legislators are more likely to use their 
time more effectively when they actually get to their constituency, resulting in higher overall 
levels of constituency service. (Wood and Young, 1997; 226)  This could also hold true for the 
countries within this study.  However, it is dependent on whether constituency service is seen as 
the primary priority once they arrive in their constituency. Based on the data from this study, it 
has become apparent legislators in a number of the sample countries do not participate solely on 
constituency service when they return to their constituency. In addition to constituency work, it 
is not uncommon for legislators to also participate in party work as well.   For the purpose of this 
study,  it is being hypothesized distance may play a role but this  is further dependent on what 
legislators perceive the main purpose of traveling back to their constituency to be.      
 Wood and Young also argue that constituencies further from the capitol may be more 
culturally separate from the core resulting in a need for legislators to spend more time with their 
constituents to reinforce the fact that there are qualified to represent them in the capitol. (Wood 
and Young, 1997; 226)  This preposition has special relevance in Sub-Saharan Africa where the 
majority of countries are highly fractionalized due to ethnic and cultural differences.   One could 
expect that legislators who represent constituencies where a minority group may be situated 
further from the capital might be expected to participate in higher levels of constituency service.  
In order to measure geographic proximity, an existing variable measuring the total 
distance between the capitol and legislators’ constituencies was recoded to reflect a new 
proximity measure. The following categories were created; when a legislators traveled less than 













between 51 and 200 kilometres to their constituency they were given a value of 1. When 
legislators traveled 201 kilometres or more they were given a value of 2. The basis for this 
categorization is that theoretically, a distance of 50 kilometres easy to achieve on a daily basis. A 
distance between 51 and 200, while possible would be slightly more difficult. Any distance 















































































Constituency Service  
 
 This study uses two measures of constituency service. The first measures the average 
number of days a month a legislators spends in their constituency and the second measures the 
percentage of time legislators report participating in constituency service. When asked about the 
number of days they spend in their constituency, legislators are asked to differentiate between 
periods in which Parliament is in session and out of session.  The following two tables provide a 
breakdown of number of descriptives relating to the two measures of days spent in the 
constituency. While only one is being used during the analysis section (in session travel), it was 
thought that a brief examination of both side by side would be beneficial.7
  
 
Table 4.1: Number of days spent in the constituency - Descriptives  
 Legislator’s reported time spent in their 
constituency per month by days when 
Parliament is in session- Descriptives 
Legislator’s Reported Time Spent in their 
Constituency Per Month by Days when 
Parliament is Out of Session 
Country Mean Median Min Max Std. 
Deviation 
Mean Median Min Max Std. 
Deviation 
South Africa 8.62 8 0 30 7.09 21.71 24.5 3.5 30 9.12 
Mozambique 2 0 0 30 5.43 4.28 0 0 30 10.60 
Kenya 8.23 7 1 30 5.24 10.58 9 0 30 7.00 
Malawi 9.52 8 0 30 9.08 16.24 10.5 0 30 12.14 
Zambia  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 
As expected, the amount of time spent in the constituency is relatively lower during the 
period in which Parliament is in session than out, across all four countries where the data is 
available. Surprisingly, South African legislators report spending more time in their constituency 
when parliament is out session relative to their counterparts in other countries. Based on the 
literature, one might expect them to spend less time than their counterparts who come from 
countries that use a FPTP majoritarian electoral system. At this point in time no definitive 
explanation can be given; however, it might be explained by two possible particularities to South 
                                                   













Africa. The first being the overall level access to funds that might facilitate travel to the 
constituency.  An indicator of this possible explanation is the percentage of legislators who have 
access to an offices paid for by either the legislature or their party. In South Africa, 84% of the 
sample have access to an office in their constituency that is paid for. This is relative to 
Mozambique, Kenya and Malawi, where only 14%, 50% and 2% respectively had access.  
A possible further explanation is the fact that there is a tendency to allocate legislators their 
home area when assigning constituencies.  
When parliament is in session, the amount of time spent in the constituency remains 
relatively constant through South Africa, Kenya and Malawi. Mozambican legislators appear on 
average to spend even less time in their constituency than their counterparts. 81 percent of 
Mozambican legislators did not travel at all to their constituency during this period. This result 
could be expected based on the electoral system and legislator’s limited access to funds from the 
legislature and party for travel.   
The decision to utilize data measuring number of days spent in the constituency when 
parliament was in session over out of session was based on the quality of the data available. 
There appeared to be more missing data for one reason or another in the variable measure 
activity out of session.  
While initially it was believed that the total time spent in the constituency would be the 
best indicator of levels of constituency service, it became apparent from further analysis that 
while legislators may be returning to their constituency, they may not be participating in 
constituency service when they are there.  In the case of Malawi, Kenya and Zambia, this 
measure of constituency service appears to be valid, as it can be shown that when legislators 
return to their constituency they participate in activities that can be constituted as constituency 
service. However, this changes when we look at countries that use a PR electoral system, 
Mozambique and South Africa. As you can see from the following graph, just over 30% of 
legislators in Mozambique indicate that their primary activity when they return to their 
constituency is participating in political party activities.  Based on the definition of constituency 
service used in this study, this does not qualify. Therefore, one cannot make the assumption that 
















As a result, while using the total amount of time spent in their constituency maybe a good 
indicator in the case of Zambia, Malawi and Kenya it is not a good indicator for Mozambique 
and South Africa. Therefore, the amount of travel to the constituency is a necessary but not 
sufficient indicator for levels of constituency service. As a result it will not be used as the sole 
indicator of constituency service in this study. Alternatively, legislators were asked to give a 
breakdown of their time, by indicating the percentage of time they spent doing a number of 
activities, including constituency service.  
The following table provides information regarding this variable. Data was available for 
all five sample countries.  
 
Table 4.2: What percentage of your time is devoted to each of the following? 
Constituency Work – Descriptives 
Country Mean Min Max Median Std. Deviation 
South Africa 30.92% 10% 60% 30% 12.48 
Mozambique 20.20% 0% 60% 20% 15.24 
Kenya 41.52% 20% 80% 40% 15.23 
Malawi 46.33% 0% 85% 50% 19.81 



















Graph 4.1: Percentage of Legislators Who 
Indicate Political Party Activities as their 
Main Activity in the Constituency
Indicated Political Party 














There seems to be a similar pattern between both measures of levels of constituency 
service, as Mozambique has considerably low levels of constituency service relative to other 
countries. Surprising though, is the high level reported by Malawian legislators relative to 
legislators in the other sample countries. They indicate that they spend just under 50 percent of 
their time doing constituency service, yet the amount of time they spend in their constituency 
both when Parliament is in session and when it is not, is not considerably higher than their 
counterparts in other countries. This could be an indication that quite a bit of their constituency 
service might take place in the capitol rather than their constituency. However, this cannot be 




  Different patterns emerge when examining the two measures of electoral 




South Africa’s distribution of APC appears to differ substantially relative to the 
distributions in the other sample countries.  There is a much higher proportion of legislators who 
fall into the “Marginal” category relative to other countries in the study. Upon further 
examination of the data there appears to be two main reasons for this. First of all, 25 percent of 









































party’s threshold. This means that they were all placed in the “marginal” competitiveness 
category. What can be ascertained from these discrepancies between the party lists and the 
legislators at the time of the interviews is that there seems to a high turn around within the South 
African Legislature. The list themselves, also seem to have little value once the election has 
passed.  An individual’s placement on the list at the time of the election holds little bearing as to 
whether they will be called to replace an existing legislator if one chooses to step down or is 
forced out.  A number of legislators quite far beyond their party’s threshold became 
replacements.  In some cases, they may not have been on the list at all. This could mean that 
those next on the list are being overlooked. This finding has a number of serious implications for 
the quality of representation in South Africa. If voters are going to the polls with the expectation 
that party lists are to be respected, meaning that those on the list will be placed in office based on 
the proportion of votes received, one must question the quality of the entire representative 
process. While it is expected that some movement will occur as legislators retire or die, the 
extent to which it is occurring indicates that party lists are not being used for their intended 
purpose.8
Based on the graph above, one might make the supposition that South Africa faced a 
much higher level of electoral competitiveness during their respective election.  Due to the 
electoral system itself, the distribution of legislators on lists is not the best indicator of the level 
of overall competitiveness within system. Between elections there is movement in party caucuses 
as legislators resign and are replaced from those further down the list. This means that as more 
legislators are replaced, the party will have a higher proportion of those in the marginal category. 
This may project the idea that the overall level of competitiveness is higher than observed at the 
time of the last election.  This means that no conclusion can be made about the overall level of 
competitiveness in the South African system based on this data.  
  
Despite South Africa’s exceptional distribution of electoral competitiveness, the other 
three countries have similar patterns.  With just over 50 percent of all legislators in the “Safe” 
category, the remaining legislators generally fall evenly into the other two remaining categories, 
“Competitive” and “Marginal”.   
                                                   
8 Note that this was the case the three largest parties in South Africa. The sample did not include enough legislators 













To determine the overall level of competitiveness experienced in elections, the level of 
variance as well as the mean within the total percent difference was also looked at.  Please note 
that only FPTP majoritarian countries are presented, as the actual difference of percentage of 
votes between the winner and first runner up is being examined.  The same analysis is not 
possible for South Africa and Mozambique due to their electoral systems.   
The following table breaks down the levels of electoral competitiveness across the three 
relevant countries; 
 
Table 4.3: Electoral Competitiveness: Mean and Variance of the Percentage 
Difference between the Winner and First Runner-Up 
Country Mean Std. Deviation 
Kenya 31.01 24.32 
Malawi 27.41 19.96 
Zambia 25.46 20.20 
 
Based on this table, it appears that all three countries faced similar levels of 
competitiveness during their respective elections. This is despite the fact that the mean 
percentage difference between the winner and the first runner up is relatively higher in Kenya 
than Malawi and Zambia. This is largely because the standard deviation is also relatively higher. 
This indicates that while the average percentage difference was higher there was also a higher 
level of variance within the scores.  
 Based on the data in this section, one might expect to see slightly higher levels of 
constituency service in Zambia and Malawi relative to Kenya.   This means that when a country 
has a higher number of constituencies with competitive elections one should also see relatively 
higher levels of constituency service as a national average.  In reality however, the distribution of 
levels of constituency service across Kenya, Zambia and Malawi did not follow this pattern. Of 
all three countries, Zambia had the lowest mean with 27.67 percent, with Malawi and Kenya 
having means of 46.33 percent and 40.24 percent respectively. This discrepancy may indicate 
that there is only a small likelihood of a relationship between these two variables, “APC” and 













 The following graph details the distribution of “Perceived Future Competitiveness” 
across the four countries in which the data was available. You will notice that across all four 
countries, except Mozambique, legislators’ perception that their seat was safe in the next election 





This data indicates 66.7 percent of South African legislators place themselves in the safe 
category.  This may be due to the changes within the political situation in South Africa. This is a 
drastic difference between earlier measures of electoral competitiveness (APC).9
Malawi also has an interesting pattern whereby 4.4 percent of legislators indicated that 
they are not planning to run again in the next election. The basis for much of the research on 
electoral competitiveness and its effects on constituency service is the assumption that the main 
goal of legislators is to be re-elected in the next election.  With such a high percentage of 
  Between the 
election in 2004, where the electoral lists were taken, and the present time, there has been a 
drastic change within the African National Congress (ANC) whereby power has shifted within 
the party itself. This may explain why those at the lower ends of the party list during the 2004 
election now perceive themselves to be in safer positions.  
                                                   








































legislators indicating that they are not planning to run again in the next election, it has become 
apparent that this assumption needs to be questioned in the future.  
A relatively high percentage (72.9%) of legislators in Mozambique placed themselves in 
the competitive category. At this point in time no definitive explanation can be given for this. 
However, it is being hypothesized that this may be due to the nomination process. In cases such 
as Mozambique, legislator’s may perceived themselves as being electorally insecure when 
political parties might have relatively more control over the process.   In order to further 
deconstruct the relationship between the nomination process and perceptions of electoral safety, 
reported nomination processes are briefly examined.  It is being hypothesized that the candidate 
selection process does play a role in dictating legislator behaviour. Data collection issues have 
prevented an in-depth deconstruction of this concept. In the case of Zambia, the question 
regarding the nomination process was not asked. In the case of South Africa, the question was 
slightly changed to also inquire about the legislator’s placement on the party list. Upon a further 
examination of the data, it became clear that legislator’s responses most often just mentioned 
their placement on the list and failed to give any further information.  The other two FPTP 
majoritarian countries and Mozambique used a multiple choice response.  As a result, the 
information is only available for these three countries.   That being said, the following table 
details the distribution of legislators across the nomination processes by country. 
 
Table 4.4: Distribution of Legislators by Nomination Process in Mozambique, Kenya and 
Malawi 
Response Malawi Mozambique Kenya 
No primary/ no nomination/ it was automatic because 
I was an incumbent/  stood as an independent 
34.1% .0% 4.8% 
Competitive primary election (where there were at 
least two candidates in the same party) 
63.6% 48.6% 81% 
Nomination by local branch 0% 0% 2.4% 
Nomination  regional branch 0% 17.1% 4.8% 
Nomination by National Party 2.3% 31.4% 7.1% 














It is interesting to note that relative to other methods of nomination, legislators indicate 
that competitive primary election is the main nomination process used across all three countries. 
That being said, it appears to be more widely used in the Kenya and Malawi relative to 
Mozambique.  However, nomination by regional and the national party branches tend to be used 
extensively in this system relatively to Kenya and Malawi.  The literature indicates that 
legislators nominated by lower regional levels of a party apparatus should be closely connected 
to that region.  It is assumed that this will lead to higher levels of constituency service by those 
legislators, in order to maintain personal connections with the region that gave their initial 
political mandate.  In contrast, Mozambique actually has the lowest average level of constituency 
service across all five countries. Based on this table, no connection can be made with regard to 
regional party nominations and levels of constituency service in the case of Mozambique as 
national party nominations are relatively higher. National party nominations have the opposite 
effect when it comes to inducements for constituency service, as the legislator’s primary 
constituency remains the national party body itself, rather than the public.10
According to this data, Malawian legislators face the least amount of competition, with 
34.1 percent of legislators indicating that they did not go through a nomination process.  Based 
on this data it is hard to tell the overall level of competitiveness within the nomination process, 
as it appears that nominations through the regional and national level seem to be relatively more 
common in Mozambique and Kenya. The true level of competitiveness would only be available 
through ascertaining the pool of qualified candidates, which is not available. However, one might 
make the assumption that for those who were nominated, the overall level of competitiveness 
may be perceived as relatively lower when compared to those who went through a competitive 
primary election.  Depending on the level of competitiveness and the basis for the nomination, it 
could be assumed that constituency levels might correspond. However, further research is needed 
to confirm this. 
 
A further explanation for varying levels of PFC may lie in the overall role of parties in 
the national political system. There is evidence to suggest that political parties play a much 
stronger role in the determination of legislator behaviour in Mozambique in relation to the other 
                                                   
10 The only time a national party nomination could encourage constituency service, is when the party itself is 
regionally based. In this case, the legislator may based their future political success on the further maintenance of 
that nomination in future elections, especially in PR systems, by heightening their interaction with the said region 
during their term.  This may especially be the case in Southern Africa, where clientalisitic relationships with those 













sample countries. Most notably when legislators were asked about how they made decisions 
about what positions they will take in Parliament, 35.9 percent of Mozambican legislators 
indicated that their party leader or the political party itself is the most important influence. This 
is relative to Malawi and Kenya where the percentage decreases substantially to 12.2 percent and 
12.5 percent respectively.  The high level of political party influence, may act to increase the 




The following graph provides the distribution of orientations across all five sample 
countries. Note that no Zambian legislator was placed into the middle category, as the 
determination of orientation was solely based on the single question relating to what legislators 




Across all five countries, we see a higher percentage of legislators falling into the locally 
orientated category than the nationally orientated category. This could be an early indication that 







Locally Orientated 41.7% 68.1% 47.6% 50.0% 75.60%
Middle Category 37.5% 23.4% 35.7% 30.8% 0







































contrast, this may be a result of a dominant political culture in all of the sample states that 
encourages legislators to be more closely related to the constituency as a result of high poverty 
levels rather than direct electoral implications. This possible explanation could directly explain a 
high percentage of locally orientated in PR electoral systems where electoral prospects are only 
tied to local areas when legislators are nominated through a local party branch. However, further 
research is needed.  
Despite all five sample countries having a higher percentage of locally orientated 
legislators over nationally orientated or the middle category, states which use a FPTP 
majoritarian electoral systems seem to have proportionally higher percentages of legislators fall 
into the locally orientated grouping over countries that use a PR system.  In neither South Africa 
or Mozambique is the percentage of legislators who fall into locally orientated category above 50 
percent.  This is in contrast to the distribution in Zambia, Malawi and Kenya, where the 
percentage of legislators does not fall below 50 percent.  In Malawi and Zambia, the percentage 
is especially high where 75.6 percent of Zambian legislators are locally orientated and 68.1 
percent of Malawian legislators are also locally orientated.   This differentiation could be an 
indicator that while the effect of an electoral system may not be as strong an influence as initially 




This first graph shows the distribution of percentage of time reported participating in 
constituency service across the two electoral systems in the study.  Note that in this initial step of 
analysis, the variable measuring percentage of time is divided into even categories, allowing for 














Based on the data, we see the separate patterns emerge between the two electoral 
systems, indicating a possible relationship between electoral systems and levels of constituency 
service. In the PR systems over 60% of the legislators spend between 20% to 39.99% of their 
time participating in constituency service.  This distribution within the PR countries is similar to 
expectations.  In the FPTP majoritarian system, legislators seem to be more evenly distributed 
across all categories.  This result was not expected, as it has been indicated the legislators from 
this electoral system consistently participate in higher levels of constituency service. Overall, this 
indicated that alternative micro-level factors play a larger role in influencing legislator behaviour 
in FPTP majoritarian systems.  There are also a number of other indicators that micro level 
variables are more important 
Note the category with the highest percentage of legislators is the same across both 
electoral systems. This could be an indicator that an alternative explanation is needed beyond 
incentive structures created by the electoral system.  It could be hypothesized that external 
influences are preventing legislators in FPTP majoritarian countries from participating in 
constituency service, for example access to funds.   
A further indicator that an alternative explanation is needed is the overall distribution 
across this electoral system, more specifically the large range and variance.  In terms of range, 
the FPTP majoritarian system has an 85% difference between the lowest and highest level of 









































When percentage of time participating in constituency service is taken out of its 
categories the level of variance provides crucial details with regard to constituency service in 
FPTP majoritarian systems.  A level of variance was measured. In the FPTP majoritarian system 
std. deviation was 18.81 relative to the PR system what had a smaller std. deviation of 15.16.   
As the level of variance appears to be relatively higher for the FPTP majoritarian system, it 
appears that alternative explanations beyond electoral systems for need to be examined. 
Incentive structures of the electoral system alone do not provide enough draw for legislators to 
participate in high levels of constituency service. 
Despite inconsistency between expectations and the distribution of constituency service 
in the FPTP majoritarian system, there is evidence to suggest there is a separate relationship 
between electoral system as a whole and level of constituency service, the mean level of 
constituency service in each electoral system. In the case of the FPTP majoritarian countries the 
mean percentage of time participating in constituency service, is 38.5%.   In the case of the PR 
countries, the mean for constituency service was just 23.8%. This difference of just under 15 





Seniority of the Legislator 
 
Table 4.5: Legislator Seniority – Descriptives 
Country Mean Min  Max Median Std. Deviation 
South Africa 8.80 5 15 10 3.50 
Mozambique  7.66 3 14 5 4.36 
Kenya 11.00 1 38 7 8.76 
Malawi 5.63 3 11 4 2.44 
Zambia 2.80 2 12 2 2.40 
 
The mean number of years legislators are elected is excepted to vary depending on the 
number of years the sample country has been participating in elections. As mentioned earlier, 
Kenya went through a period in which a single party controlled the state. During this time 













Multiparty elections have been taking place since 1992, however legislator elected through the 
single party system were still able to run for office in the new system, thus explaining how a 
legislator could be elected into office for 38 years. (Barkan, 1993; 86) This situation explains a 




Table 4.6: Age – Descriptives 
Country Mean Max Min  Median Std. Deviation 
South Africa 53 35 75 54 10.46 
Mozambique 47.76 30 75 47 9.08 
Kenya 56.12 39 80 55 9.43 
Malawi 47.21 29 71 46 9.50 
Zambia 49.08 29 59 49 8.68 
 
Across all five countries the distribution of age is quite similar. Additionally, levels of variance 
also appear to be stagnant across all of the sample countries. This is not unsurprising based on 











































Kenya’s distribution is most likely explained by the fact that the complete sample of legislators 
is yet to be interviewed. When all 50 legislators are interviewed the distribution between the 
ruling party and opposition parties will most likely even out.  However, this cannot be confirmed 







The distribution is quite similar across all five of the sample countries. It is expected that 
countries with landmasses larger relative to the other countries within the study will have a 
higher percentage of legislators traveling further distances. As can be seen from the graph, this is 
exactly what happened, with South Africa and Mozambique legislators being more likely to 



























Graph 4.8: Geographic Proximity by 
Country
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Electoral Competitiveness and Constituency Service 
 
 This first section of analysis will examine electoral competition and its possible 
relationship with constituency service within the context of the following hypothesis; 
 
H1: A positive relationship will exist between the levels electoral competitiveness and 
the levels of constituency work reported by legislators. As electoral competition 
increases, an increase in constituency service should be visible.  
 
In order to get a full understanding of the possible relationship, two measures of electoral 
competition will be examined, APC and PFC.  In addition to using two separate measures of 
competition, two measures constituency service also be used.  Two sets of analyses were 
completed. Both were done by country in order to minimize the possible affect of the electoral 
system. The first set of analyses was bivariate, as constant variables were not included. The 
second set of analyses was multivariate as “age”, “legislator seniority”, “proximity to the 
constituency” and “party membership” were held constant . The analysis between APC and 
















 Based on the results of the bivariate analysis there does not appear to be a relationship in 
any of the sample countries between either measure of constituency service and APC.  However, 
when the multivariate analyses are performed a single moderate relationship is discovered 
between percentage of time reported participating in constituency service and APC in Malawi.  
The relationship is negative, meaning that as competitiveness increases legislators appear to be 
spending less of their time participating in constituency service. This result is contrary to 
expectations.  
 While no definite conclusion can be made about the results from Kenya, the multivariate 
results here are an indication that if the sample size was larger there could possibly be a 
relationship between the number of days spent in the constituency and APC. Once again though, 
the direction of the possible relationship is contrary to what is expected, legislators could be 
spending less time in their constituency as competitiveness increases.  
Now the study will turn to the analysis associated with FPC and levels of constituency 
service. The earlier analysis was conducted on data that was thought to have guided legislator’s 
perceptions of their own electoral safety.  The following group of analyses is conducted on data 
measuring how legislators perceive their chances of re-election in the forth-coming elections. In 
                                                   
11 The acceptance threshold for significance was increased as a result of the small size of the sample.  
Table 5.1: Analyses Results - APC by Electoral Competition (Kendall’s Tau-B) 
Country 
# of Days Spent in 
the Constituency 
when Parliament 






# of Days Spent in 
the Constituency 
when Parliament 







South Africa -.186** -.091 -.077* .052* 
Malawi -.058* .130 -.078* -.330*** 
Kenya -.018* -.070* -.161** .108* 
Mozambique n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Zambia n/a .005  n/a -.015 













order to get a general understanding of the relationship between the two variables, the first set of 
analyses were conducted without the constants.  
 
Table 5.2: PFC by Electoral Competition (Kendall’s Tau-B) 
Country Number of Days 
Spent in the 
Constituency 
when Parliament 






Number of Days 
Spent in the 
Constituency when 







South Africa .348*** .076* .612*** .273** 
Malawi -.012 .005 -.114* .112* 
Kenya -.018* .247*** -.158* .198* 
Mozambique .008 -.065* -.114* .084* 
Zambia n/a n/a n/a n/a 
***p<.1, **p<.5, *p<.9 
 
A number of relationships are registered when FPC is tested with both measures of 
constituency service.  There is a strong relationship between FPC and the number of days spent 
in the constituency in South Africa.  It is the only country were a strong relationship is measured. 
In Kenya, the moderate relationship is measured in the bivariate analysis but it is later weakened 
with the introduction of the constant variables. So why are strong or even moderate relationships 
only being measured in South Africa and not the other sample countries? At a micro level there 
could be a number of explanations for this. First of all, in South Africa legislators are assigned 
constituencies once they are elected into office. Quite often these constituencies are where the 
legislator comes from as well. This creates a connection between the party, the legislator and the 
constituency and explains a high level of travel to the constituency when Parliament is both in 
and out of session. Furthermore, in comparison to other countries within the study legislators are 
much more likely to have a constituency office paid for by their party. Since South African 
legislators’ have access resources that facilitates travel to the constituency, then can then return 













the case for legislators in the other sample countries, and therefore explains the lack of 
relationships.     
Based on the analyses of electoral competition, both APC and PFC, a number of 
important conclusions can be drawn. It appears that electoral competition plays a limited role in 
influencing legislators in their decision on how much constituency service they will participate 
in.  Other than in South Africa, it appears that higher levels of competitiveness, both perceived 
and actual, may in fact induce legislators to spend less time participating in constituency service.    
 
Role Orientation and Levels of Constituency Service 
 
In order to examine role orientation and its relationship with the level of constituency 
service, the type of statistical analysis was changed slightly to take into account the nature of the 
data. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was run on a country by country basis in order to make 
sure that macro level factors such as the electoral system did not affect the results.   In an attempt 
to make sure that the best measure of constituency service was used, the two variables were 
utilised, number of days in the constituency when parliament is in session and the percentage of 
time spent participating in constituency service.  
 As mentioned in earlier sections, there are three distinct role orientations, locally 
orientated, nationally orientated and a middle orientation. In Zambia, only two orientations were 
recorded.  The purpose of this analysis is to test the following hypothesis; 
 
H2: A relationship will exist between legislator role orientation and reported time spent 
doing constituency work. Locally orientated legislators are expected to participate in more 





























Number of Days Spent 
in the Constituency 
(eta = .241) 
Mean 9.1389 9.3889 4.8750 
Std. Deviation 8.48078 7.15794 3.88104 
N 9 9 4 
Percentage of Time 
spent Participating in 
Constituency Service 
(eta =.363) 
Mean 34.50 25.00 34.00 
Std. Deviation 13.006 8.660 16.733 
N 10 9 5 
 
Based on the results it has been determined that role orientation in South Africa does not 
have a significant effect on the number of days legislators spent in the constituency when 
parliament was in session[F(2,19)=.584 p=.567].12
 
 This is not unsurprising after reviewing the 
mean number of days spent in the constituency when parliament is in session by each role 
orientation. More specifically when comparing between the locally orientated legislators 
( =9.14) and the middle orientation (  =9.39), where both are quite similar. In order to make 
sure that all possible measures of constituency service were included in the analysis a second test 
was completed using the total percentage time spent participating in constituency service. Once 
again, with p<.05 it was established that role orientation did not have a significant effect on the 






























Number of Days Spent 
in the Constituency 
(eta = .274) 
Mean 9.76 6.38 7.00 
Std. Deviation 6.73 2.56 3.70 
N 20 8 7 
Percentage of Time 
spent Participating in 
Constituency Service 
(eta = .394) 
Mean 43.75 41.25 27.86 
Std. Deviation 13.46 22.16 6.36 
N 20 8 7 
 
In Kenya the analysis indicated that role orientation does not have a significant effect on 
the number of days legislators spend in their constituency when parliament is in session 
[F(2,32)=1.35, p=.283].13
 
 The same analysis was completed with the alternative measure of 
constituency service (percentage of time). It was determined that role orientation does not have a 
significant effect on the total percentage of time spent participating in constituency 
[F(2,32)=2.98, p=.065].  However, “Nationally orientated” legislators appear to spend 
considerably less time participating in constituency service than their counterparts who fall in to 
the “local” or “middle category”, indicating that if the sample size was larger there is a 































Number of Days Spent 
in the Constituency 
(eta =.209) 
Mean 8.5161 12.9091 8.0000 
Std. Deviation 8.76687 11.11265 .00000 
N 31 11 2 
Percentage of Time 
spent Participating in 
Constituency Service 
(eta = .253) 
Mean 45.31 54.55 36.25 
Std. Deviation 19.216 22.300 16.008 
N 32 11 4 
 
In Malawi it was determined that role orientation does not have a significant effect on the 
number of days spent in the constituency when parliament is in session[F(2,41)=.938, p=.400]. 
When percentage of time spent participating in constituency service was examined. The same 
result was found, no significant effect[F(2,44)=1.505, p=.233]. Similarly to Kenya, the results 
indicate that role orientation may have a slightly larger effect on percentage of spent 
participating in constituency service, however, this not for certain as the results of the analyses 

































Number of Days Spent 
in the Constituency 
(eta = .328) 
Mean 1.0000 4.5833 .0000 
Std. Deviation 2.64575 8.56482 .00000 
N 15 12 4 
Percentage of Time 
spent Participating in 
Constituency Service 
(eta = .143) 
Mean 22.00 18.00 16.67 
Std. Deviation 15.252 16.987 16.021 
N 20 15 6 
 
Based on the results from Mozambique, it was determine that role orientation does not 
have a significant effect on the number of days legislators stay in their constituencies when 
parliament is in session [F(2,28)=1.687, p=.203).14 It has also been established that role 
orientation does not have a significant effect on the percentage of time legislators spend 





































Number of Days Spent 
in the Constituency 
 
Mean n/a n/a n/a 
Std. Deviation n/a n/a n/a 
N n/a n/a n/a 
Percentage of Time 
spent Participating in 
Constituency Service 
(eta = .181) 
Mean 29.39 n/a 23.18 
Std. Deviation 15.849 n/a 11.890 
N 33 n/a 11 
 
 
In the Zambian questionnaire, legislators were not asked about the number of days they 
spent in their constituency when parliament was either in or out of session. As a result, analysis 
was only completed on the percentage of time legislators indicated participating in constituency 
service. Despite this, it has been concluded that role orientation is not a significant factor in 
legislators decision to determine what percentage of time they will devote to constituency service 
[F(1,42)=1.415, p=.241]. 
 
Electoral System and Levels of Constituency Service 
 
Based on the level of measurement of electoral system, it was determined that one-way 
ANOVA is the best way to analyze this section of the data. The following hypothesis is 
associated with these variables;  
 
H4: There will be a relationship between electoral system and levels of reported 
constituency service. Countries using a FPTP majoritarian electoral system will have 














Based on an alpha level of .05, it was concluded that the electoral system in which 
legislators originates is a significant factor in the number of days in which they spend in their 
constituency when Parliament is in session [F(1,145) =12.55, p=.001].  This means that 
depending on the electoral system legislators on average spend different amounts of time in their 
constituency when parliament is in session. On average legislators from a FPTP electoral system 
spend four more days per month in their constituency in comparison to legislators who come 
from a PR system. The reported percentage of time spent doing constituency service was also 
examined. While directly not comparable, it has been concluded based on the p value, that the 
electoral system is an even stronger influence on the percentage of time legislators report 
participating in constituency service [F(1,208)=33.21, p=.000].   
 
Electoral System and Role Orientation 
 
The following hypothesis is being tested in this section of the analysis; 
 
H3: A relationship will exist between electoral systems and legislator role orientations.  In 
the PR system, it is expected that a proportionally high number of legislators will be 
nationally orientation. This is in contrast to the FPTP majoritarian system where it is 
expected that a proportionally high number of legislators are expected to be locally 
orientated.  
 
According to the Cramer V correlation coefficient there is a moderate relationship 
between electoral system and role orientation [r = .255 sig.=002].  This indicates that the 
literature arguing that electoral systems influence the belief structures of legislators appears to 
relevant in the Southern African context. The fact that earlier analysis indicates that there does 
not appear to be a relationship between role orientations and the levels of constituency service 
possibly shows that role orientations in fact influences other aspects of legislators perception of 
their role outside their relationship with their constituency. Further research is needed on this 



















The last set of analyses will test the validity of the entire model by taking the independent 
variables (electoral competition, role orientation, age, proximity to the capital, party membership 
and seniority) and performing linear regression with the each measure of constituency service. 
While earlier tests looked at the independent relationships between each of the independent 
variables and constituency service, the purpose of performing these tests was to determine the 
relative explanatory powers each of the independent variables.  
 
Table 5.8: Multiple Regression Analysis Result – Number of days on Average spent in the 
Constituency when Parliament is in Session 
Factor Beta t-value 
Electoral System – PR  .002 .012 
APC– Marginal  .224 2.266 
APC – Competitive  .263 2.660 
APC - Safe .357 3.276 
FPC - Marginal .006 .065 
FPC - Competitive  -.079 -.489 
FPC - Safe -.013 -.079 
Role Orientation - Local .055 .410 
Role Orientation – Middle 
Category 
.160 1.226 
Role Orientation – National -.048 -.453 
Age .111 1.260 
Legislator Seniority -.073 -.884 
Distance – 0-50 kms .220 1.511 
Distance – 51-200 kms .172 .768 
Distance – 201 kms and above .032 .133 
Party Membership – 
Opposition Membership 
-.016 -.191 















In order to perform these tests the categorical variables were turned into binary variables. 
Legislator seniority was recoded from number of years in office to 0=1-5 years and 1=6 and 
greater years.  This was done to make a distinction between those who had remained in office for 
more than one term. Age was originally captured as a continuous variable, however it was 
recoded to 0=0-50 years old and 1=51 and older.  
As a result of the relatively small size of the sample, the adjusted will be used to 
determine the overall strength of the model. Accordingly, this combination of independent 
variables can account for 16 percent of the variance within the dependent variable measuring the 
average number of days spent in the constituency when parliament is in session. Within these 
results we can make a number of important conclusions. We can conclude that between the two 
measures of electoral competition, APC appears to have the most influence over the number of 
days legislators spend in their constituency relative to FPC. It also appears that the distance 
needed to travel to the constituency also plays a role in determining the amount of time the 
legislators spends there. However, as the distance between the legislator and their constituency 
increases, distance becomes a reduced factor in predicting the amount of time legislators will 
spend in their constituency.   
 Surprisingly, it appears that party membership does not explain any variation in levels of 
constituency service, despite earlier results. This is an indicator that as a whole level of APC 
seems to be a stronger predictor.  The number of days spent in the constituency by South African 
legislators was generally high as a result of a number of reasons. This situation could possible 
provide an explanation as to why the electoral system in general does not act as a good predictor 
for the number of days spent in the constituency. If other PR systems were to be included within 
this study, it would not be surprising of the relevance of the electoral system increased.  
The next table provides the results of analyses conducted on “percentage of time spent 

















Table 5.9: Multiple Regression Analysis Results – Percentage of Time Spent Participating 
in Constituency Service 
Factor Beta t-value 
Electoral System –PR .266 2.654 
APC– Marginal  .253 2.945 
APC – Competitive  .253 2.945 
APC – Safe .274 2.429 
FPC – Marginal .042 .608 
FPC - Competitive  .307 3.291 
FPC – Safe .258 3.007 
Role Orientation – Local .018 .161 
Role Orientation – Middle 
Orientation 
.002 .016 
Role Orientation – National -.140 -1.456 
Age -.068 -.994 
Legislator Seniority -.033 -.481 
Distance – 0-50 kms -.046 -.475 
Distance – 51-200 kms .025 .181 
Distance – 201 kms and above -.027 -.187 
Party Membership  .033 .465 
=.269,Adjusted  = .208, F=4.428, Sig=.000  
 
This is an stronger model overall with the independent variables accounting for 20.8 
percent of the variance in legislator’s reported percentage of time spent conducting constituency 
service.  APC appears to remain the main predictor of levels of constituency service between the 
two measures of electoral competitiveness, however, it also appears that if a legislators perceives 
that they are in a competitive seat this could also be a strong predictor of levels of constituency 
service.  Surprisingly, “age” and proximity to the constituency” seemed to have reduced in 



























































The next section will take the form of a discussion piece based on results of this study 
and how it relates to existing literature. As already noted before, the nature of literature on 
legislative behaviour in Africa has tended to focus on legislatures as a single unitary actor, often 
failing to focus on legislators as actors in their own right. (Kim, Barkan, Turan and Jewell, 1984; 
8)  That being said, along with the data used in this study, the existing literature can provide 
extensive guidance as to possible factors affecting individual legislator behaviour beyond what 
has already been examined in this study. This section will turn to some of the broader literature 
on African legislatures to further examine how the results garnered in this study relate to wider 
research. 
A number of strong conclusions can be made. First, it appears that an electoral system is 
a factor in amount of time legislators spend participating in constituency service. This means that 
structures incorporated into the electoral systems used within the sample countries have impacts 
on the overall level of constituency service legislators participate in. Since, PR electoral systems 
do not create an electoral relationship between a constituency or district and an individual 
legislator it is not surprising that in the PR countries levels of constituency service were 
relatively lower levels of constituency service. This being said, the distribution of constituency 
service within each electoral system indicates that further investigation is needed to get a 
complete understanding of how legislators determine what level of constituency service they will 
engage in. Furthermore, the results of analyses on micro level factors and levels of constituency 
service indicate that the reasoning used to come to the study’s initial hypotheses are not 
sufficient in providing a complete explanation for the varying levels of constituency service 
across the sample states. 
Discrepancies tended to centre around hypotheses based on Western literature. As a result 
a general conclusion is being made about the relevance of this literature towards Southern 
African legislators. Based on the results, it has become clear that factors initially thought to have 
affected legislators in certain ways may in fact lead to contrary behaviour. For example, while it 
is apparent that electoral competition can affect levels of constituency, it cannot be concluded 
that higher levels competition lead to higher levels of constituency service in all cases.  In the 
sample countries APC and PFC appear to have different relationships, if having a relationship at 
all, with levels of constituency service. For example in Kenya and Malawi where it appears that 













constituency service.  Rather than concluding that individual political cultures across the five 
sample countries explains these discrepancies between the literature and the results in this study, 
further explanations can be drawn out of existing literature.  
 It is no secret that African legislatures are often highly under resourced.  This means that 
certain approaches to resource management often lead to certain behaviour by legislators.  It has 
been argued that one of the largest influences of certain behaviours is who controls the 
parliamentary budget. If the legislature determines its own budget, they are much more likely to 
allocate themselves sufficient salaries and provide for adequate parliamentary staff and 
resources. Whereas if the executive has sole responsibility for this role, a pattern emerges where 
the institution tends to be underfunded, forcing legislators to go elsewhere for basic resources.  
This in turn shifts power away from the legislative branch as a whole and places the power back 
with the executive. (Barkan, Ademolekun and Zhou, 2004; 229)   
 It must be assumed that legislators who are forced to go to alternative sources for funds 
are much more likely to be politically swayed by other actors.  This is also especially pertinent in 
Southern Africa, where aspects of neopatrimonial regimes are quite common.  Defined as  
regimes where a leader maintains their control of rule through the maintenance of clientalistic 
relationships rather than through ideology or law, neopatrimonial regimes are surprisingly 
common.(Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994; 458)  There is evidence to suggest that legislators 
tend to be highly susceptible to the development of this style of interaction with many of the 
actors they interact with, ranging from the executive to local dignitaries within their 
constituencies. (Barkan, 1995)  Burnell discusses this style of relationship between Zambian 
legislators and the executive. He argues that passive behaviour towards the executive became 
entrenched in legislator’s behaviour during the country’s Second Republic, where one party rule 
was active. Since then, there has been a move to increase the independence of the legislature, 
however, due to legislator’s requirements to provide services to their constituents they are forced 
to maintain a close relationship with the executive.  This is based on the fact that a legislator’s 
chances of securing spending for their area vary with their relationship with senior 
ministers and the President. (Burnell, 2003; 59) 
 This situation were legislators may be forced to develop close relationships with the 
executive provides a good explanation as to why legislators who perceive electoral uncertainty in 













means necessary to participate in constituency service they may be forced to spend more time in 
the capital participating in other activities that would more likely allow for the acquisition of 
funds to allow for constituency service or more basically campaign funds. Furthermore, if 
campaigning is organized through the party, legislators may find it to be more beneficial to spend 
time in the capitol to participate in party work in order to gain favor, so that party campaign 
funds are likely channeled to their constituency, enhancing their chance of reelection.   
In addition to the pressure from the capitol to develop clientalistic relationships due to 
resource allocation issues, it is apparent that there is considerable pressure from the 
constituencies to provide goods for constituents.  This pressure may in turn discourage legislators 
from returning to their constituencies if they lack the funds necessary to provide for constituent 
expectations.  Southern Africa is one of the poorest places on earth. Between the five countries in 
2008 the average GNI per capita was 1,542 USD, with South Africa being the outlier with a 
score that was over five times higher than the next on the list, Zambia. (World Bank, 2009)  This 
means that basic social services are often hard to come by, especially in more rural areas. With 
limited access to resources, legislators have the ability to affect the pattern by which resources 
are allocated at local levels through such work as constituency service. Furthermore, this means 
that perceptions by constituents maybe twofold.  First, they may be regarded as a representative 
of their needs in the capital, a more traditional role associated with modern democracy.  Second, 
legislators may be perceived as agents that have ability to extract resources from the capitol and 
redistribute them within their constituency.(Barkan, 1984; 77) Perceiving a legislator in this way 
increases the overall pressure for legislators to pursue increased levels of resources in order to 
fulfill constituent expectations.  There is evidence to suggest that high levels of pressure to 
produce both public and private goods for their constituents may in fact decrease a legislator’s 
propensity to participate in constituency service as a whole.  Within the questionnaires, a number 
of legislators indicated that they chose not to return to their constituency due to high expectations 
placed on them by constituents.  Even if legislators are able to afford to return, they may chose 
not to if they lack resources to provide services to their constituents once they get there.   A 
number of legislators indicated the pressure to provide funds for school fees and funerals was an 
overriding reason why they chose not to return to their constituency on a number of occasions. 













effect on their future election prospects than visibly returning to the constituency and not 
providing goods expected by constituents.    
 It has been concluded that based on the analysis conducted within this study that further 
research needed in a number of areas. The completion of ALP will provide a number of answers 
to questions raised within this study.  On a basic level, incomplete datasets created issues with 
the data in regards to South Africa and Kenya. Upon completion, a number of questions could be 
answered. That being said, it is doubtful that the overall conclusion will differ significantly.  It is 
believed that the type relationship between electoral competition and level of constituency would 
continue to vary in the sample countries. That being said, a focus needs to be placed on financial 
factors and the overall distribution of power between the executive and legislature to get a better 
understanding of legislator behaviour outside the legislature.  The access to resources is 
integrated with the issue of the distribution of power.  As executives in Southern Africa tend to 
hold much of the power, it should be no surprise that legislators’ resource base should also be 
affected. This study was able to provide evidence that factors traditionally associated with 
legislator behaviour outside the legislator have limited relevance in Southern Africa. 
Furthermore, it has started to provide the foundations of research geared towards discovering the 





Based on these results a number of suggestions can be made to donors about program 
design. First and foremost, programs need to focus on providing legislators with the basic funds 
needed to allow them to effectively perform their jobs. The failure to do so, will in many senses 
forced them to turn to alternative sources of funds.  This in turn disturbs the natural distribution 
of power between arms of government.  By ensuring basic resource access, a large step can be 
taken toward maintaining the separation between the executive and the legislature. There are a 
number of way in which this can be done.  Just one is the widespread implementation of 
Constituency Development Funds (CDFs), which as has already started in many recipient 
countries.  Programs such as this one allow for the greatly needed disassociation of individual 













Beyond disassociating constituency development with the executive, CDFs are expected 
to lead to higher levels of constituency service.  This has two positive implications. First, by 
using such funds, donors have the possibility of increasing the effectiveness of legislators as 
agents for development within their constituencies.  Second, CDFs can facilitate travel to the 
constituency as well as work in it and correspondingly enhance the overall quality of 
representation. Ultimately, this has positive implications for the overall quality of democracy. 
In the case countries using a PR electoral system, South Africa and Mozambique, the 
results of this study indicate that further effort needs to be made to encourage legislators to 
perform constituency service. As already argued early in the study, other methods of 
communication and representation, such as civil society and media, are often less developed in 
many African countries. Legislators possess a unique role in providing linkage between the 
county’s electorate and the government. If they choose not to interact with the government, one 
must therefore question the total quality of democracy within the said state.  Therefore it is 
recommended that instruments be put in place to provide further inducements to perform 
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